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Abstract
The empirical literature on the relationship between inequality and growth oﬀers a
contradictory assessment: Estimators based on time-series (diﬀerences-based) variation
indicate a strong positive link while estimators (also) exploiting the cross-sectional (level-
based) variation suggest a negative relationship. Using an expanded dataset, the present
paper confirms this conflicting pattern — and reconciles it on the basis of a simple model.
We argue that the diﬀerences-based methods are prone to reflect the mostly positive short-
or medium-run implications of inequality while the level-based estimators also incorporate
more negative long-term consequences. Thus, the latter estimates come close to reflecting
the adverse overall impact of inequality in the long run.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, theoretical work has come up with a substantial number of channels
through which inequality may influence economic growth, either in a positive or in a negative
direction (see, e.g., Galor, 2009, for a recent and comprehensive overview). These theoretical
contributions have made clear that the impact of inequality is quite complex and likely to
depend on, among other things, the specifics of a country (e.g., the stage of economic devel-
opment; the extent of market failures; the form of government) or the time horizon considered
(e.g., medium run vs. long run). This theoretical ambiguity is mirrored in the empirical lit-
erature which — mainly based on broad panels of countries — finds both significantly positive
and negative eﬀects, and sometimes no eﬀects at all.
Yet, a closer look at the empirical literature reveals an interesting pattern. Estimates based
on time-series variation only (e.g., estimations relying on first-diﬀerences estimators such as
those in Forbes, 2000; Li and Zou, 1998; Benhabib and Spiegel, 1997) find a strong positive
impact of inequality. On the other hand, estimates which also exploit the cross-sectional
variation in the data, such as the random-eﬀects estimators in Barro (2000), find a negative
relationship (and significantly so in samples that exclude rich countries). Such a negative link
is also present in earlier studies based on simple cross-country OLS estimates (e.g., Alesina
and Rodrik, 1994; Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Deiniger and Squire, 1998; Clarke, 1995).
These results in the literature can already be seen from a look at some crude data. Panel
a. of Figure 1 is based on time-series variation only. Exploiting multiple observations within
countries, it plots changes in the log GDP p.c. against changes in the lagged Gini coeﬃcient
and reveals a mildly positive relationship. Panel b. highlights the relationship in levels. It plots
the log GDP p.c. against the lagged Gini coeﬃcient and documents a clear negative link.1
Figure 1 here
This paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we show that the pattern of
existing results is indeed driven by the choice of methods rather than idiosyncratic diﬀerences
across studies (such as the selection of countries, time periods, or included control variables).
We do so by taking advantage of an expanded and more comprehensive inequality data set.
Also in this much larger data set, the first-diﬀerences GMM estimator consistently indicates
a strong positive inequality-growth relation while the system GMM estimator (which also ex-
ploits the cross-sectional variation) indicates a negative link (and significantly so in all but the
1Figure 1 is about inequality and GDP p.c., both in terms of first diﬀerences (panel a.) and levels (panel
b.). It is this variation that is exploited in the GMM estimation below (see equations 1 and 2 of Section 2.1).
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richest countries). Second, we interpret these results through the lens of the recent theoretical
literature on growth and development. We argue that the standard regression equation under-
lying most empirical estimates is (mis-)specified in a way that induces (i) the first-diﬀerence
GMM estimators to systematically pick up the positive (short—run) eﬀects; (ii) the system
GMM estimator to reflect primarily the negative (long-run) consequences.
To convey our argument in a precise way, we introduce a simple model. This approach
helps us to shed light on the associated biases involved in empirical estimates that rely on
time-variation versus cross-sectional variation, respectively. The model mirrors that inequality
has both positive and negative eﬀects on growth and, importantly, that these diﬀerent eﬀects
cluster in a specific way. On the one hand, inequality can promote growth by fostering aggregate
savings (Kuznets, 1955; Kaldor, 1955); by promoting the realization of high-return projects
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993); or by stimulating R&D (Foellmi and Zweimueller, 2006).
On the other hand, inequality may hamper growth by promoting expensive fiscal policies (Per-
otti, 1993); by inducing an ineﬃcient state bureaucracy (Acemoglu et al. 2008); by hampering
human capital formation (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2004); by leading to political
instability (Bénabou, 1996); or by undermining the legal system (Glaeser et al., 2003). Most
of the positive eﬀects (e.g., those operating through convex savings functions, market imper-
fections or innovative incentives) rely on purely economic mechanisms. Arguably, these eﬀects
materialize relatively fast, in the short or medium run. Most of the negative eﬀects, however,
involve the political process, the change of institutions, the rise of socio-political movements,
or they operate through changes in educational attainment of the population. Arguably, these
eﬀects take time and materialize primarily in the long run.
On the basis of these theoretical arguments, the seemingly contradictory evidence on the
inequality-growth relationship can be reconciled in a quite natural way. Studies that exploit
mainly the time-series dimension of the data, such as the first-diﬀerences GMM estimator,
regress changes in (log) output on (slightly) lagged changes in inequality. When inequality
goes up, the positive short- or medium-run eﬀects are associated with positive changes in
inequality while the subsequent negative changes (i.e., those coming from the long-run eﬀects)
are treated as noise. In other words, the first-diﬀerences estimator is biased in the sense that it
only reflects the positive short- or medium-run eﬀects while leaving out the potentially adverse
long-run consequences of higher inequality (see Panel a. of Figure 1).
In contrast, the system GMM estimator is likely to find a negative relationship, in particular
if (i) the negative long-run eﬀects dominate the positive short- or medium-run eﬀects and (ii) if
inequality is highly persistent (which is actually true in the data). Under these circumstances,
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the majority of observations is either of the type “low level of inequality and high level of
output” or “high level of inequality and low level of output.” Hence, the system GMM estimator
(which also exploits the cross-country variation) tends to reflect a negative relationship (see
Panel b. of Figure 1) — which corresponds to the true overall impact of inequality.
This paper is part of a small literature which is trying to get a better grasp of the empirical
picture with respect to inequality and growth. Earlier contributions include Banerjee and
Duflo (2003) and Voitchovsky (2005). The former paper presents evidence suggesting that
changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth in the short run; as
a result, the standard regression equation might be mis-specified in a way that — misleadingly
— makes diﬀerences-based estimators indicate a positive relationship. Voitchovsky (2005), by
contrast, argues that inequality coming from the top end of the distribution is indeed likely to
promote growth while bottom-end inequality tends to be harmful. She thus suggests controlling
separately for inequality coming from diﬀerent parts of the distribution (and finds supportive
evidence in a panel of rich countries). None of these papers, however, focuses specifically on
the time dimension, and so we view our paper as complementary.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the empirical results
and links them to the earlier literature. In Section 3, we interpret our findings through the
lens of the existing theoretical literature. Section 4 introduces a simple model to make our
reasoning more precise and to gain additional analytical insights. Section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical Analysis
We now apply the standard estimators to a common data set, relying on a common set of
controls. We find the inequality-growth relationship to be consistently positive when we rely on
time-series variation only (first-diﬀferences GMM estimator) and consistently negative when we
also consider cross-sectional variation (system GMM estimator). This suggests that the pattern
of existing results is driven by the choice of methods rather than idiosynchratic diﬀerences
across studies (such as the selection of countries, time periods, or control variables).
2.1 Specification and Estimation
Specification and data. We rely on a standard 5-year panel data model which is similar to
those used in several recent empirical studies on growth (e.g., Caselli et al., 1996; Barro, 2000;
Forbes, 2000; Voitchovsky, 2005). Specifically, we estimate the linear regression equation
 − −1 = −1 + x0δ +  +  +  (1)
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where  = 1 · · · denotes a particular country and  = 1 · · ·  is time (with  and − 1 five
years apart). The variable  stands for the log of real GDP per capita so that the left-hand
side of equation (1) approximately gives country ’s five-year growth rate in the years between
 − 1 and . On the right-hand side, we have −1 to control for convergence; a vector x
consisting of variable (and observable) country characteristics; a period-specific eﬀect  to
capture productivity changes common to all countries; a country-specific eﬀect  to capture
time-invariant (and unobserved) country characteristics; an idiosyncratic error term 
The vector x consists of the Gini index and three additional standard control variables.
In line with the recent literature (e.g., Perotti, 1996; Forbes, 2000), these additional variables
are the average years of secondary schooling in the population aged over 25 (separately for
males and females) and the price level of investment (to control for market distortions). In
general, the explanatory variables are measured at the beginning of each 5-year period. In case
of inequality, this is not always possible because the Gini index is not usually available on an
annual basis. In these cases, we take the last available value in the previous 5-year period.
The analysis includes up to 90 countries and covers the period from 1966 to 2005. The GDP
per capita data comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI; World Bank, 2006) and
is in constant 2000 US$. The Deininger and Squire (1996) data base serves as the primary
source for the inequality data. However, in order to broaden our sample in the cross-sectional
as well as the time-series dimension, we also rely on a subsidiary source, the UNU-WIDER
(2008) data base.2 Finally, the education data comes from Barro and Lee (2000) and the
source for the price of investment is Heston et al. (2006; PWT 6.2). More detailed sources and
definitions for these variables as well as some summary statistics are presented in Table 1.
Table 1 here
Estimation methods. It is well-known that the standard panel data methods (i.e., fixed-
eﬀects [FE] and random-eﬀects [RE] estimations) are unlikely to provide consistent estimates
of  and δ (see, e.g., Bond et al., 2001). Obviously, using the random-eﬀects estimator is
problematic because the unobserved country eﬀect,  is most likely correlated with the other
explanatory variables. A second problem emerges when we rewrite model (1) as
 = ( + 1)−1 + x0δ +  +  +  (2)
Equation (2) highlights that controlling for convergence in a panel data growth model actually
introduces a lagged dependent variable. As a result, even if equations (1) and (2) gave an
2Some of the Gini coeﬃcients are based on income and others on expenditures. To account for this, we follow
Deininger and Squire’s (1996) and Forbes’ (2000) suggestion to add 66 points to expenditure-based coeﬃcients.
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accurate description of reality, both the RE estimator and the FE estimator would be very
likely to give inconsistent estimates of the parameters  and δ
To deal with these problems, the literature has developed specific GMM estimation tech-
niques, most notably the first-diﬀerence GMM estimator and the system GMM estimator.
The first-diﬀerence GMM estimator was developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and is similar
to the FE estimator in the sense that it employs only within-country variation. The idea is
to eliminate the country-specific eﬀect by diﬀerencing model (2) and then to use suﬃciently
lagged values of  and x as instruments. However, although the first-diﬀerence GMM estima-
tor “solves” the problems of unobserved heterogeneity and lagged dependent variables, it has
been criticized for the fact that it does not exploit the variation in levels. The main concern is
that the cross-sectional variation embodies a large part of the information since within-country
inequality is quite persistent.3 Thus, ignoring this cross-sectional variation may give rise to
unnecessarily large biases and imprecision. One way to address these shortcomings is to use
the system GMM estimator pioneered by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
(1998). While requiring a slightly more stringent set of restrictions, the system GMM pro-
cedure does better in terms of eﬃciency since — like the RE estimator — it also exploits the
cross-country variation in the data (see, e.g., Bond et al., 2001, for the details).
In what follows, we will apply both GMM estimation techniques to our expanded dataset
and document that — consistent with the existing empirical picture — the two approaches lead
to systematically diﬀerent estimation results. Sections 3 and 4 are then devoted to explaining
these diﬀerences across methods, also with the help of a simple model that incorporates both
short-run and long-run eﬀects of inequality on growth.
2.2 Results
Time-series variation only. We now go through the first-diﬀerence estimation results. To
connect with the previous literature, we first present evidence based on a sample which is
similar to that in Forbes (2000) in terms of countries included and periods covered. We then
show that these results are quite robust to the inclusion of additional countries and more recent
observations (from the WIDER data base) as well as to a number of other modifications.
The first column of Table 2 gives the results based on the Forbes sample (which includes 42
countries and covers the 1965-1995 period). Like Forbes, we find a significant positive impact
of inequality on growth, and the magnitude of the eﬀect is very similar: On an annualized
3This observation also applies to our dataset: The adjusted 2 from a regression of the Gini coeﬃcient on
country dummies is 084 (and rises only to 085 if time dummies are also included).
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basis, our estimates imply a coeﬃcient of 00015 while Forbes (2000) reports one of 00013. As
the second column shows, the coeﬃcient on inequality remains significant and comparable in
size after extending the sample by two additional 5-year periods (i.e., the 1996-2000 and 2001-
2005 periods). Similarly, as documented in the third column, the inclusion of 28 additional
countries does not change the basic empirical finding: Higher inequality has a significantly
positive impact on (short-run) growth, albeit the eﬀect is somewhat smaller in the broader
country sample (which includes a larger fraction of less-advanced countries).4
Table 2 here
The remaining columns of Table 2 document the robustness of this empirical outcome to
some natural variations. First, the estimates in columns (4) and (5) are based on subsets of
the full sample. Specifically, column (4) shows the impact of inequality in countries which
are classified as high income or upper-middle income (according to the 2009 World Bank
definition); column (5) provides the corresponding results for the remaining countries (lower-
middle income or low income). Apparently, although the two subsets contain very diﬀerent
economies, the estimated impact of inequality is still significantly positive in both cases and
also of very similar size across the two country groups.
The second modification concerns the time structure of the panel. In order to check whether
the above results are not just an artifact of the 5-year structure, the estimates in columns (6)
and (7) are based on four 10-year periods. The results suggest that higher inequality tends
to foster growth also over this medium time horizon, and the size of the estimated impact is
somewhat larger: For instance, on an annualized basis, the coeﬃcient in the fourth column (5-
year periods; high and up-mid countries) is 000082 while the corresponding coeﬃcient for the
10-year structure is 000114. However, the estimates are less precise — which is not surprising
given that we have a much smaller number of observations.
The validity of the first-diﬀerence estimator depends on the absence of serial correlation in
the error terms,  This means that the diﬀerenced error terms should not show second-order
serial correlation (though they have a first-order correlation by construction). The statistics
1 and 2 in Table 2 give the -values associated with the tests for, respectively, first-order
and second-order correlation in the 4−series. As the numbers show, serial correlation may
only be an issue in the first regression (Forbes replication) but not in columns (2) — (7).
4Note that 20 of these 28 additional countries are low income countries or lower-middle income countries
according to the classification by the World Bank (2006). As a result, in the full sample, 47% of the countries
fall into these two categories (while the rest belong to the categories upper-middle income or high income).
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Time-series and cross-sectional variation. Table 3 presents the results based on the
system GMM estimator. The first column presents the estimates based on the full sample.
Unlike in all the regressions shown in the previous table, the estimated impact of inequality
on growth is now negative, yet not significantly so.5 More precise results can be gained by
splitting the country sample along income classes (columns 2 — 4). It turns out that, as shown
in the second column, the system GMM estimates also indicate a positive impact of inequality
among the small group of high-income countries. However, there is no significant relationship
among upper-middle-income countries (third column),6 and — most importantly — the system
GMM estimates indicate a negative impact in the large group of countries with lower-middle
income or low income (fourth column). Note further that switching to a 10-year structure
again confirms the results obtained under the 5-year structure (columns 6 and 7 of Table 3).
Table 3 here
So, even though the test statistics at the bottom of Table 3 support the validity of the
instruments with this estimation strategy too, the system GMM approach paints a decidedly
diﬀerent picture than the first-diﬀerence estimator: While the latter uniformly points to a
positive relationship (and thus confirms the results of, e.g., Li and Zou, 1998; Forbes, 2000),
the findings here suggest that the impact of inequality on growth is negative (or at least non-
positive) in countries which are not among the richest. Note that this result is perfectly in
line with Barro’s (2000) random-eﬀects analysis (which also exploits cross-sectional as well as
time-series variation) and also matches the results in earlier OLS-based studies such as those
of Alesina and Rodrik (1994) or Persson and Tabellini (1994).
3 Interpreting the Empirical Results
The present section looks at how these seemingly contradictory estimation results can be
interpreted and reconciled. We proceed in two steps. The first step is to stress that, in fact,
the existing literature suggests that both relationships should be present in reality (Subsection
3.1). In the second step, we argue that regression equation (1) is mis-specified so that the two
diﬀerent GMM estimators are prone to systematically reflect just one of the two relationships,
5The number of countries included in the sample rises to 90 since the system GMM estimator also includes
moment conditions on the basis of the level form of the regression equation (and hence — in contrast to the
first-diﬀerence estimator — does not strictly require two consecutive observations).
6 If we combine — as in Table 2 — high-income countries and upper-middle income countries in one sample,
the estimated coeﬃcient on inequality is insignificant (result not reported in the table).
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namely the positive one in the case of the diﬀerences-based approach and the negative one if
the estimator also exploits cross-sectional variation (Subsection 3.2).
3.1 Short-run and Medium-run Eﬀects vs. Long-run Eﬀects
Inequality aﬀects economic performance through many channels, and the theoretical literature
prominently discusses both negative and positive eﬀects. As for the positive channels, the lit-
erature has long argued that savings functions tend to be convex in wealth (see, e.g., Kuznets,
1955; Kaldor, 1955). So, other things equal, higher inequality is associated with higher ag-
gregate savings and thus faster convergence to the balanced growth path. More recently, the
focus has been on the impact of inequality on the selection of physical investment projects
(see, e.g., Matsuyama, 2000, in particular Section 4). The main argument here is that, if the
financial system is imperfect, access to external finance depends on personal wealth. As a
result, if wealth is widely spread among the population, nobody may be able to raise suﬃcient
funds to realize high-return projects which require large minimum investments. In this case,
a more concentrated distribution of productive assets may put at least a limited number of
entrepreneurs into a position to realize such projects — and thus boosts growth.7 This eﬀect
is reinforced by the fact that the high-return projects are often the more risky ones (see, e.g.,
Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). As a result, with a relatively equal wealth distribution,
the number of entrepreneurs who are suﬃciently rich to absorb significant risks may be very
small. So, once again, a more concentrated distribution of wealth may multiply the number
of high-return projects realized. Finally, the literature also discusses positive demand-side ef-
fects. With a more unequal distribution, a larger fraction of total demand falls on “high-end”
products (as opposed to goods satisfying basic needs). Thus, potential innovators benefit from
larger home markets which more easily support the investments required to develop novel or
better varieties (see, e.g., Foellmi and Zweimueller, 2006). Clearly, this positive demand-side
eﬀect is more relevant in advanced economies where R&D is the main driver of growth.
While all these positive eﬀects work through diﬀerent channels, they have one thing in
common: They all emphasize purely economic mechanisms. As a result, we should expect
these eﬀects to materialize relatively fast. This, however, is clearly diﬀerent in the case of
the negative channels. Some of the most prominent negative links rely on political-economy
arguments. For instance, it has been pointed out that more unequal societies tend to have
7 It has also been argued that, with convex technologies and financial markets imperfections, higher inequality
deteriorates economic performance because investment returns are more heterogeneous. However, as shown by
Foellmi and Oechslin (2008), this is by no means a robust theoretical prediction.
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higher levels of redistribution and hence higher levels of taxation — which weakens the incentives
to save and invest (see, e.g., Perotti, 1993). A related argument focuses on the composition
of government expenditures. With higher inequality, the decisive voter tends to supply fewer
production factors (i.e., physical or human capital). As a result, he may strongly prefer direct
transfers (“handouts”) over productivity-enhancing investments in public goods. Finally, even
if political power rests with the rich, inequality may still have a negative impact via the fiscal
policy channel. As highlighted by Acemoglu et al. (2008), if inequality is high, an oligarchic
government has incentives to set up an ineﬃcient bureaucracy in order to avoid high taxation
once the country is transformed into a democracy.8 Yet, at least via these channels, changes
in inequality cannot be expected to have an immediate eﬀect on economic performance. It
certainly takes time for shifts in the population’s policy preferences to be reflected in similar
changes within the legislative body. Moreover, even with a fresh legislature in place, altering
tax laws (or even changing the bureaucracy) is a time-consuming process.
Note further that the remaining negative eﬀects are also unlikely to materialize quickly. If
higher inequality reduces aggregate spending on human capital formation (see, e.g., Galor and
Zeira, 1993; Galor and Moav, 2004), it arguably takes a decade or more for the eﬀects to be
felt. Similarly, it may be a long time before disaﬀection caused by higher inequality is bundled
in social movements which then may threaten political stability (see, e.g., Bénabou, 1996) or
before higher inequality has undermined the reliability of the judicial system and the security
of property rights (see, e.g., Glaeser et al., 2003).
3.2 Diﬀerences vs. Levels
Our brief literature survey clearly suggests that the positive and negative eﬀects of inequality
cluster in a very specific way: The positive eﬀects tend to materialize quickly while the neg-
ative eﬀects need more time to emerge. The present subsection argues that it is exactly this
pattern which is responsible for the diﬀerent estimation results obtained above. To see this, it
is convenient to look first at the diﬀerences-based methods (e.g., the first-diﬀerence GMM esti-
mator). Clearly, since these methods regress changes in output on moderately lagged changes
in inequality, they are likely to pick up the short-run or medium-run eﬀects — and thus to find
a positive relationship. To give an example, if inequality goes up, aggregate output tends to
respond positively in the short or medium run because, for instance, a higher wealth concentra-
8More generally, based on the experience of the colonization of the New World, Sokoloﬀ and Engerman
(2000) argue that huge wealth inequalities may promote institutions that protect the privileges of the elites and
restrict opportunities for the broad masses — with adverse consequences for economic development.
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tion supports a larger number of high-return investments while the supply of the public good or
the quality of the institutions have yet to deteriorate. As a result, diﬀerences-based methods
associate a positive change in inequality with a positive change in output but — due to the
specific time structure of the panel — fail to systematically attribute the subsequent negative
changes (i.e., those changes coming from the long-run eﬀects) to the initial increase in inequal-
ity. Put diﬀerently, the negative changes are just treated as noise, and so the diﬀerences-based
methods are set to find a positive eﬀect.9
However, methods also exploiting the variation in the levels (e.g., the system GMM esti-
mator) are nonetheless likely to find a negative link, in particular if two conditions are sat-
isfied. First, the long-run eﬀects must dominate the short-run or medium-run eﬀects and,
second, within-country inequality has to be a rather persistent phenomenon. Note, however,
that there are indeed good reasons to assume that these conditions hold. As for the relative
strength of the diﬀerent eﬀects, a broad empirical literature suggests that institutional quality
has a dominant impact on economic performance (see, e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2001). Regarding
persistence, our data as well as an elaborate literature support the notion that countries do
not frequently undergo significant changes in inequality. To see now why under these circum-
stances the cross-sectional methods find a negative link, consider two countries which have
had diﬀerent degrees of inequality for a while. Then, other things equal, the low-inequality
country (i.e., the country with the good institutional quality) would have a higher GDP than
the high-inequality country (i.e., the country with the bad institutional quality). Hence, if
within-country inequality was perfectly persistent over time, the level-based methods would
find a clear-cut negative link between inequality and economic performance — which is driven
by the comparatively strong long-run eﬀects. Yet, inequality is not completely persistent, and
so the data-generating process creates observations which potentially “mire” the picture. For
instance, following a switch from low to high inequality, we may have a number of observations
with both high inequality and high output because the positive eﬀects have already set in
but the negative long-run eﬀects are still to come. However, if within-country inequality is
persistent, such transition periods are relatively rare and a large fraction of the observations
is either of the type “high inequality and low output” or “low inequality and high output.”
Accordingly, the data points that do not fit into this latter pattern are treated as noise (i.e.,
driven by exogenous shocks), and the regression analysis points towards a negative relationship
9The argument is completely symmetric for negative changes in inequality. The time-series methods link
negative changes in inequality to contemporaneous negative changes in output but fail to attribute subsequent
improvements to the initial decline in inequality. Again, the long-run eﬀect is just regarded as noise.
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— which can be interpreted as the overall relationship in the long run.
4 A Formal Approach
We now introduce a parsimonious model to make the above reasoning precise. Doing so also
helps us to go one step further by exploring how closely diﬀerences-based methods come in
estimating the true short-run eﬀect and similarly level-based methods in estimating the true
overall eﬀect. In particular, the model shows that the associated biases depend on three crucial
magnitudes, the short-run eﬀect, the long-run eﬀect, and the persistence of inequality.
Assumptions. We focus on an infinite-horizon economy which is populated by a continuum
of individuals of measure 1. All agents derive utility from consumption of a single (non-storable)
output good, and preferences are represented by the inter-temporal utility function
 = 
( ∞X
=0
+
)
 (3)
whereas  denotes consumption in period . Individuals diﬀer regarding their endowment with
the productive asset (which we may interpret as “skills,” for instance). A fraction   12 of
the population (the “poor”,  ) is endowed with  ()  1 units of this asset, whereas 1 is the
average endowment in the economy. The endowment of the remaining agents (the “rich”, ) is
then given by () = (1− ())(1−)  1 The state variable  ∈ {} represents
the degree of inequality, whereas  stands for low inequality so that  ()   (). Note
further that, at the beginning of each period, inequality may change exogenously. In particular,
we have  = −1 with probability  and  6= −1 with probability 1 −  Thus, a high
value of  mirrors strong persistence in inequality In practice, a change in the distribution of
skills may be due to a shock to the educational system which improves the quality of primary
education relative to that of university education, for instance.
Suppose further that the individuals have access to a simple linear technology of the form
( ) = ()() (4)
with  ∈ {} whereas  is a group-specific productivity parameter and () denotes the
level of the public good provided by the government. Rich agents are assumed to be more
productive than the poor:     A natural way to think of this assumption is that the more
productive technology requires a certain skill level which cannot be achieved by the poor.10
10More generally, this assumption can be seen as a reduced-form representation of the notion that only
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The state variable  ∈ {0 1} reflects whether — in the previous period — the government has
invested in the public good, with 1 indicating investment. Hence, (1)−(0) ≡ 4  0
On the aggregate level, we can now easily infer that (private-sector) output is given by
 ( ) = ¡ − ( −  ) ()¢() (5)
Other things equal,  is higher in the high-inequality state ( = ) since a larger fraction
of the productive asset is allocated to the high-return technology; similarly, output is higher if
the level of the public good is high ( = 1). In what follows, we impose
(1)−(0)
(1) ()−(0) ()  
 − 
  (6)
so that  ( 1)   ( 0). As we will see below, this condition ensures that — in the interesting
equilibrium — the long-run eﬀect of inequality dominates the short-run eﬀect.
Turning to the public sector, suppose that the government has access to an income stream
of  units of the final good. We can think of this income as arising from a publicly owned
enterprise, the natural resource sector, etc. Regarding public spending, the government has to
decide on +1 in each period . A decision to invest is associated with a contemporaneous
cost of    units of the final good. The budget surplus is distributed to the population in
a lump-sum manner. Finally, when deciding on +1 we assume that the government has no
choice but to implement the variant preferred by the majority of the population, i.e., the poor.
An interesting equilibrium. We now show that our model is able to generate equilibrium
patterns that are consistent with the estimation results outlined in Section 2. The first step is
to establish that the level of the public good may fluctuate over time:
Proposition 1 Suppose that the following condition holds:
4
 
 ¡ () + (1− ) ()¢ ≥ 1  4  ¡ () + (1− ) ()¢  (7)
Then, the equilibrium shows fluctuations in the provision of the public good, with a positive
level of investment in times of low inequality (i.e., +1 = 1 if  = ) and no investment in
times of high inequality (i.e., +1 = 0 if  = )
Proof. See Appendix.
Intuitively, when condition (7) holds, the poor prefer direct transfers over investment in the
public good if inequality is high. This is because if  =  they can gain little from productive
relatively rich people can rely on high-return technologies because — as discussed in Subsection 3.1 — the
financing of such technologies requires good access to the financial system (which the poor lack).
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public investment. However, in the case of low inequality, this gain is suﬃciently strong to
make the poor prefer productive investment over higher lump-sum transfers.
Note that the model predicts that an increase in inequality generates both a short-run
increase and a long-run reduction in output. Corollary 1 discusses the associated co-movements
of inequality and output in terms of changes (as captured by diﬀerences-based estimators).
Corollary 2 looks at the relationship in levels (as captured by the level-based methods).
Corollary 1 Suppose that conditions (6) and (7) hold. Moreover, assume that inequality has
been unchanged between − 2 and − 1 Then,
(i) an increase in inequality in period  (i.e., −1 = →  = ) leads to a contempora-
neous increase in output (−1 =  ( 1)   =  ( 1)); however, in + 1, output declines
sharply, with inequality either unchanged or decreasing.
(ii) a decrease in inequality in period  (i.e., −1 =  →  = ) leads to a contempo-
raneous decrease in output (−1 =  ( 0)   =  ( 0)); however, in  + 1, output rises
sharply, with inequality either unchanged or increasing.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 is that the level of the public good is a state variable
and thus cannot change quickly. So an increase in inequality must lead to a positive eﬀect on
output in the short run (i.e., with  still at the high level) but to a negative one in the long
run (i.e., when the increase in inequality has undermined to provision of the public good).
Corollary 2 Suppose that the conditions (6) and (7) hold. Moreover, assume that inequality
is persistent (i.e., that  is “high”). Then, over time,
(i) a large fraction of the observations ( ) will either be “low” inequality and “high”
output, (  ( 1)) or “high” inequality and “low” output ( ( 0))
(ii) very few observations ( ) will either be “low” inequality and “(very) low” output,
(  ( 0)) or “high” inequality and “(very) high” output, ( ( 1))
The central point behind Corollary 2 is persistence in inequality. Persistence means that
periods with changes in inequality — which generate observations of the type (“high” inequal-
ity/“high” output) or (“low” inequality/“low” output) — are relatively infrequent.
Estimating the relationship. We now discuss how the diﬀerent estimation methods reflect
the inequality-output relationship that is implied by data generated from the present model.
An illustrative way to do so is to give a graphical representation of the two corollaries in a
single picture — which is done in Figure 2. To see how the figure is constructed, consider the
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case of an increase in inequality in period . If the focus is on changes (Panel ), the following
observations are generated: Observation −1 in period −1, observation 0 in period  (when
the short-run eﬀect materializes), and — in period  + 1 — observation 1 (if  is unchanged
in  + 1 so that only the long-run eﬀect materializes) or observation 1 (if  decreases in
 + 1 so that the long-run eﬀect materializes together with a negative short-run eﬀect). The
remaining observations in Panel  can be generated by going through the opposite case, i.e.,
by considering a decrease in inequality in period . Note that the numbers in Panel  refer to
the same thought experiments, but from the perspective of the levels. The two panels further
indicate the theoretical frequencies with which the diﬀerent types of observations occur.
Figure 2 here
Figure 2 illustrates that the diﬀerent aspects of the relationship between inequality and
output are picked up by diﬀerent estimation methods. If the relationship is assessed on the
basis of changes (Panel ), we can see that estimating a linear regression would give us a clear
positive relationship. On the other hand, if levels are considered (Panel ), fitting a linear trend
line would arguably point to a significant negative impact of inequality (since the observations
marked by a bigger dot are much more numerous than the remaining observations).
It might also be interesting to look at the diﬀerent estimation methods from a more formal
perspective. We start by deriving the formal relationship between output and inequality, given
that conditions (6) and (7) hold. Taking logs on both side of equation (5) gives us
 ≡ ln = ln
µ
1− 
 − 
 
 ()
¶
+ ln
µ
1 +
4
(0)
 −−1
 − 
¶
+ ln  + ln(0)
whereas the second term on the right-hand side represents the equilibrium expression for
((−1)) Assume now further that  () = 1 −  Then, the above expression can
be approximated by the linear regression equation
 = 1 + 2−1 +  +  (8)
whereas 1 ≡ (− ) 2 ≡ −4((0)(−)) and 1+2  0 due to condition (6).
The sum of the constant terms is represented by  (which we allow to vary across countries)
and — as in equation (2) —  denotes an idiosyncratic error term which reflects exogenous
influences on private-sector output.11 Obviously, the key diﬀerence between the theory-based
equation (8) and the standard equation (2) is that the former also includes lagged inequality,
−1 while the latter just ignores earlier levels of inequality.
11The constant  may be country-specific due to, for instance, cross-country diﬀerences in the levels of firm
productivity (even though ( −  ) is constant across countries).
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We are now able to analytically determine the biases if model (8) were true but the impact
of inequality was estimated based on the mis-specified regression equation
 = 1 +  +  (8’)
with  ≡  + 2−1 representing the “error term”. If we fit a regression line like the
one in Figure 2. (i.e., OLS based on diﬀerences), the estimated coeﬃcient converges to
1− 2(1−) as the number of observations goes to infinity; on the other hand, if we consider
a regression similar to that in Figure 2. (i.e., OLS based on levels), the estimator of 1
converges to 1+ 2(2− 1) Note that these limits become arbitrarily close to 1 and 1+ 2,
respectively, as  approaches 1. Thus, as already informally argued above, the estimated
coeﬃcient approximates (but overstates) the positive short-run relationship when we rely on
first diﬀerences while the level-based estimator approximates (but understates) the negative
overall consequences which materialize only in the long run. Note that this pattern is robust
to the application of more advanced estimation techniques. In particular, when we estimate
the mis-specified model (8’) by applying the first-diﬀerence and system GMM estimators to
data generated by the model, we consistently find that the former estimator comes close to
reflecting the short-run eﬀect while the latter approximates the negative overall eﬀect.12
5 Conclusions
This paper reconciles seemingly contradictory results in the empirical literature on the inequality-
growth relationship. Empirical studies that exploit time-series variation only (diﬀerences-based
studies) find a positive relationship between inequality and growth, whereas studies that also
exploit cross-sectional variation (level-based studies) suggest a negative link. We argue that
these findings can be reconciled using early and more recent arguments put forward in the
theoretical literature on the relationship between inequality and economic development.
The theoretical literature suggests that the growth-promoting eﬀects arise from purely
economic mechanisms (convex savings, capital market imperfections, innovation incentives).
These mechanisms tend to set in relatively quickly, i.e., in the short or medium run. In
contrast, growth-reducing eﬀects arise from politico-economic considerations and/or arguments
that involve educational attainment. These mechanisms take more time and materialize only
12Details can be obtained from the authors upon request. In brief, we used the model to generate panel data
sets consisting of observations of the type ( ), with  = 1 · · · 50 and  = 1 · · · 20 These data sets were
then used to estimate (8’) with the first-diﬀerences and system GMM estimators. The exact Stata commands
were, respectively, xtabond2 y D, gmmstzle(D) robust nolevelequ and xtabond2 y D, gmmstzle(D) robust.
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in the long-run. This observation is important in at least two diﬀerent dimensions. First, with
this specific time pattern in mind, we can interpret the existing — and seemingly conflicting
— empirical results in a natural way: The diﬀerences-based estimation methods (i.e., the FE
or first-diﬀerence GMM approaches) are likely to systematically pick up the beneficial short-
or medium-run implications — and thus tend to indicate a positive relationship. The level-
based methods, on the other hand, also reflect the slowly materializing (but more powerful)
adverse consequences of inequality; thus, the mostly negative results associated with RE or
system GMM estimators should be interpreted as the overall eﬀect of inequality in the long
run. Second, the observation that the positive and the negative consequences of inequality
manifest themselves at diﬀerent points in time has implications for future empirical research:
Regression equations including just one (linear) inequality term are likely to be mis-specified.
According to our model, an appropriate equation should include several Gini coeﬃcients which
control for inequality at diﬀerent points in the past. Clearly, the successful estimation of such
equations requires long time series — and thus may become feasible only in the future.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The first step is to introduce some notation. The value function
of a representative member of group  ∈ {} is denoted by  ( ) whereas  and 
are the two state variables. Thus, when thinking about the preferred level of the public good
tomorrow, the poor individuals (i.e., the decisive agents) have to solve the recursive problem
  () = max+1∈{01}
© ()() +  −+1 +  ©  (+1 +1)ªª 
A solution to this problem is a policy function +1 =  ( ) which gives tomorrow’s
level of the public good, +1 as a function of the two state variables.
We now prove that if condition (7) holds, the proposed policy function is in fact a solution
to the recursive problem stated above. To do so, we have to establish that in any given period
 it is indeed optimal to stick to the policy function stated in the proposition — provided that
this policy function is applied in all future periods + 1 + 2 · · · More precisely, we have to
establish that — irrespective of the value of  — the representative poor agent finds it optimal
to choose (i) +1 = 1 if  =  and (ii) +1 = 0 if  =  (again, provided that this rule
is invariably applied in the future). The formal condition for point (i) to hold is
  () =  ()() +  −  +  ¡  ( 1) + (1− )  ( 1)¢
≥  ()() +  +  ¡  ( 0) + (1− )  ( 0)¢ 
whereas the second line in the above expression gives the value if the decision is in favor of the
alternative choice, +1 = 0 Rearranging terms yields the much simpler restriction
 ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢+ (1− ) ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢ ≥  (A-1)
which is indeed independent of  Similarly, for point (ii) to be true, we must have
 ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢+ (1− ) ¡  ( 1)−   ( 0)¢   (A-2)
which is again independent of the current level of the public good, 
To proceed, we now have to find explicit expressions for the value diﬀerentials   ( 1)−
  ( 0) and   ( 1) −   ( 0) which show up in (A-1) and (A-2). Assuming that the
proposed policy function is applied in all (future) periods, the two diﬀerences are given by
  ( 1)−   ( 0) =  () [(1)−(0)] 
with  ∈ {} Using this last expression in (A-1) and (A-2) completes the proof.
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